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PAY TELEVISION AND SECTION 605 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934: A NEED
FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Over the past two decades television viewers have enjoyed a prolifera-
tion of new video broadcast technologies., Specialized video program-
ming has supplemented conventional over-the-air television broadcast-
ing.2 While advertisers or contributors support conventional television,
pay television (pay TV) depends upon subscribers for revenue.3 Conse-
quently, pay TV companies offering multipoint distribution service
(MDS)' or subscription television (STV)5 limit their audiences to
subscribers by transmitting a special signal that only subscribers can
receive through equipment that the companies provide.' Competitors
' See OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, POLICIES
FOR REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES, 11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STAFF
REPORT]; Elder, Subscription Television, The FCC, and the Courts, 15 ST. Louis L.J. 283,
283 (1970).
2 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. Some pay television (pay TV) companies transmit
programming via a multipoint distribution service (MDS). E.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home
Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of
Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). A company offering MDS services
transmits a high frequency signal that conventional television sets cannot receive. 467 F.
Supp. at 526. Company affiliates at designated distribution points receive the signal, con-
vert it to a lower frequency that conventional sets can receive, and retransmit the signal to
subscribers' homes. Id. Pay TV companies offering subscription television services (STV)
transmit a scrambled video signal and a special audio signal directly to subscribers' homes.
E.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1980); Na-
tional Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
Since conventional television sets cannot receive STV signals without special equipment,
subscribers rent decoding devices from an STV company. 637 F.2d at 461. MDS and STV
programming consists of recent movies and sporting events. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at
22.
Other video technologies that supplement conventional television include cable televi-
sion, video cassettes, and video discs. !d. at 10. Cable systems transmit programming from
an originating site through a cable and into homes. Id. at 17. All cable systems transmit
local television broadcasts, and many carry movies and sporting events not shown on con-
ventional television. Id. at 17, 21. Some cable companies offer channels devoted exclusively
to news, sports, and children's programming. Id. at 21. Video cassettes and discs operate
through players attached to regular television sets and mainly offer movie programming.
Id. at 18, 22-23.
3 STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. Typically, pay TV company revenues come from
receiver or player equipment installation and rental charges and from monthly subscription
fees. Id. Pay TV companies do not derive revenue from commercial advertisers. Id. at 11-15.
' See note 2 supra.
5 See id.
; See Note, Federal Communications Law And Unfair Competition, 56 CAL. L. REV.
526, 536-37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Unfair Competition].
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who "pirate"7 a pay TV company's programming and sell it to nonsub-
scribing viewers, or who provide the public with devices capable of
decoding the company's signals enable viewers to enjoy pay TV pro-
gramming without remunerating the transmitting company.' Program
pirating can deprive a pay TV company of potential customers and cause
its business to decline.' Recently, several pay TV companies offering
MDS or STV programming have sought to employ section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934 to gain protection from unauthorized recep-
tion and use of their transmissions."
The Communications Act (Act)1 established the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC)2 and granted the FCC regulatory authority
over wire and radio communications. 3 Section 605 is a criminal statute
' "Piracy" of pay TV programming is the unauthorized reception and use of pay TV
transmissions. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525,
526-28 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) (suit for damages and injunction against unauthorized reception and
use of plaintiffs pay TV transmissions); Henry, The Convention Relating To The Distribu-
tion Of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted By Satellite: A Potshot at Poaching, 7
INT'L L. & POL. 575, 576 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Henry] (dicussing pay TV signal piracy
in context of satellite broadcasts).
8 See, e.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir.
1980) (suit to enjoin defendants from distributing to viewers devices to receive plaintiff pay
TV company's programming); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F.
Supp. 525, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (suit for damages and to enjoin defendant from pirating
and selling plaintiffs pay TV programming to nonsubscribing viewers).
' See Henry, supra note 7, at 576 (companies transmitting television programming
from satellites could suffer from signal piracy).
" See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir.
1980); National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 379 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); text accompanying notes 52-87 supra.
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
1' Id. § 151(a). The Communications Act of 1934 (Act) charges the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) with regulation of interstate and foreign communications by wire
and radio. Id. § 153(b). The Act directs the FCC to exercise its regulatory power to provide
efficient wire and radio communications services at reasonable rates, to aid national
defense, and to promote safety of life and property through the use of communications. Id.
Television programming is included under the Act's classification of radio communications.
Allen B. DuMont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950); 47 U.S.C. § 153(b)
(1976). The Communications Act amended the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 1969, 44 Stat. 1162
(1927) (amended 1934), which applied only to radio communications. See Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1937). The Communications Act directs the FCC to classify
radio stations and to assign each station a broadcast frequency. 47 U.S.C. § 303(a), (c) (1976).
In addition, the FCC must promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of
the Act and study new uses for radio to encourage increased use of radio in the public in-
terest. Id § 303(f), (g). The Act also empowers the FCC to grant radio station licenses if the
Commission believes the stations will serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Id. §§ 307(a), 309(a). The FCC may revoke any station license for cause. Id § 312(a).
"' 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Act broadly defines wire communications as the
transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds by wire or other connection be-
tween the points of origin and reception of the transmission. Id. § 153(a). The definition of
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prohibiting unauthorized persons from intercepting, receiving, or
assisting in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio, and forbidding a person from using such communication for per-
sonal benefit.14 Although section 605 does not provide an express civil
remedy, courts readily have granted an implied private cause of action
for persons claiming harm by violators of the statute.1 5 Section 605 ex-
cludes from its protection radio communication broadcasts intended for
radio communication is identical to the definition of wire communication, except that the
transmission medium for radio communications is radio waves and not a physical connector.
See i& § 153(b).
11 Id. § 605. The United States Supreme Court has determined that § 605 applies to in-
trastate and interstate communications. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
Violators of the statute face a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment up to one year,
or both. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1976). In the past, courts have invoked § 605 primarily to ex-
clude wiretap evidence at trial. See, e.g., Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957)
(evidence obtained through wiretapping by state law enforcement officials inadmissible in
federal court as violating § 605); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (evidence
obtained through wiretapping by federal officials inadmissible in federal court as violating §
605). But cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 108-09 (1975) (police officers who
overheard phone conversation by listening on extension at request of one party to conversa-
tion did not violate § 605 because no interception occurred). Some courts reasoned that one
of the major purposes of § 605 was to counteract the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). E.g., United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480, 481 (D.D.C. 1953). Olmstead
held that the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution did not prohibit
wiretapping or the use of wiretap evidence at trial. 277 U.S. at 466. The Supreme Court's
decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), however, superceded § 605 as the
basis for excluding evidence obtained through wiretapping. See id. at 359. Katz overruled
Olmstead and held that the warrantless use of an electronic device to overhear a private
telephone conversation violated a defendant's fourth amendment expectation of privacy,
and that evidence so obtained was inadmissible at trial. Id. at 353, 359.
11 See, e.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459,466 (6th Cir.
1980) (Pay TV company granted private right of action under § 605 against persons who sold
equipment capable of receiving company's signals); Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 741
(2d Cir.), affd, 365 U.S. 458 (1960) (victim of wiretap in violation of § 605 had implied cause of
action under statute); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (subscription radio station granted private cause
of action under § 605 against company that distributed equipment capable of receiving sta-
tion's signal). In granting a private cause of action under § 605, the Sixth Circuit has reasoned
that Congress intended § 605 to protect people who communicate by wire and radio from
having their communications received by unauthorized persons. 637 F.2d at 466. Thus, § 605
creates a federal right in favor of persons who communicate by wire or radio. Id. Further-
more, while the legislative history of § 605 is silent on the question of intent to create or
deny a private remedy, such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute to protect wire and radio communications. Id. Finally, a cause of action under § 605
is not one relegated to state law, since communications regulation is a federal concern. Id.
The foregoing analysis follows the steps that the Supreme Court has set out for finding an
implied private remedy in a federal statute. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Private
parties have sought various remedies under § 605 including damages and injunctive relief.
See, e.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1980)
(injunction); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (damages and injunction); note 14 supra (suppression of evidence).
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the general public.16 A determination of the scope of section 605 protec-
tion thus requires an interpretation of the term "broadcasting."'
17
The Act defines "broadcasting" as the transmission of radio com-
munications that the broadcaster intends the public to receive. 8 Pay TV
companies have argued that because their programming is intended only
for paying subscribers and not for the general public, pay TV does not
fall within the Act's definition of "broadcasting."'19 The companies have
maintained that section 605 prohibits unauthorized interception of pay
TV programming by nonsubscribers. 0 Persons accused of pirating com-
pany signals have responded that section 605 does not protect pay TV
since pay TV transmissions are broadcasts intended for the public." In
addressing this conflict, courts have referred to a number of judicial and
administrative discussions of the meaning of "broadcasting" under the
Act.' Resolving the issue of whether pay TV programming constitutes
"broadcasting," and consequently, whether section 605 applies to pay
TV, requires an examination of several attempts by the FCC and the
federal courts to construe the Act's definition of "broadcasting" in the
context of radio services.
In several early broadcast station licensing decisions, the FCC
observed two general classifications of radio communications." "Broad-
cast" services were unaddressed communications of general interest to
the public.24 "Point-to-point" communications were addressed to a par-
ticular listener or a limited class of listeners.25 The FCC concluded in
these early licensing decisions that messages intended for specific
listeners in a broadcast station's audience were not broadcasting but
point-to-point communications not authorized by a broadcast license."
" 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
" See, e.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459,462 (6th Cir.
1980) (construing Act's definition of "broadcasting" to determine whether § 605 applicable
to STV); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (construing Act's definition of "broadcasting" to determine whether § 605 applicable
to MDS).
"' 47 U.S.C. § 152(o) (1976).
" See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir.
1980); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 681, 682 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
, See, e.g., Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461, 465-66
(6th Cir. 1980); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc. 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 & n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 464 (6th Cir.
1980); National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381 (C.D.
Cal. 1980).
1 See text accompanying notes 23-50 infra.
I Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219 (1939); Bremer Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 79
(1935); Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194 (1935).
' Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939).
25 Id.
" See id. (local police department messages not broadcasting); Bremer Broadcasting
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The first judicial interpretations of "broadcasting" arose in attempts
to classify two types of FM subscription radio music,2 simplex systems2
and multiplex systems." With simplex transmissions of background, or
"functional" music," subscribers received an FM station's regularly
scheduled programs over their radios.' Subscribers received both music
and spoken material.12 The FCC determined that simplexing was not
"broadcasting" under the Communications Act because the transmis-
sions were directed to subscribers and not primarily intended for public
reception." The FCC concluded that a radio station licensed solely to
provide broadcasting services to the public could not provide simplex
services. 4 In Functional Music, Inc. v. F.C.C.,11 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the FCC's ruling
and held that simplexing did constitute "broadcasting" under the Act.'
The court reasoned that the FM signal was intended for public recep-
tion, even though a segment of the audience could delete portions of the
broadcast.'7 The Functional Music court found the requisite intent to
Co., 2 F.C.C. 79, 83 (1935) (coded horse race results not broadcasting); Scroggin & Co. Bank,
1 F.C.C. 194, 195-96 (1935) (answers to listeners' personal problems not broadcasting). In
Carrell, the FCC stated in dictum that its regulations and the terms of broadcast station
licenses authorized only the transmission of a broadcast service of interest to the general
public. 7 F.C.C. at 222. The FCC concluded that any transmission intended for a specific
listener or a limited class of listeners was point-to-point communication which the station
must discontinue. Id. The FCC acknowledged the distinction between broadcasting and
point-to-point communications in a 1963 decision holding that a licensed broadcast station
should not transmit messages requesting that a specific doctor call the physicians bureau.
KFAB Broadcasting Co., 1 BAD. REG. (P&F) 403, 404 (FCC 1963). The FCC reasoned that
such private transmissions constituted use of a broadcast station for the transmission of
point-to-point messages. Id.
" Functional Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 813
(1959); KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp.
35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
23 See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 40-43 infra.
Background, or "functional" music is FM music without commercials or other
spoken messages, used by subscribers in their places of business. Functional Music, Inc. v.
F.C.C. 274 F.2d 543, 544 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 544.
" Id. Simplex stations emitted a supersonic signal that activated a special device in-
stalled in the subscriber's radio. Id. This supersonic "bleep" cut off the broadcast signal when
the station aired spoken material and then reconnected the signal when the programming
returned to music. Id.
"See Report and Order, 11 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1590, 1591 (1955), construed in STAFF
REPORT, supra note 1, at 120-21 & n.10. The FCC determined that simplex transmissions
constituted point-to-point communications. Id. The Commission concluded, therefore, that
an FM licensee's overall operations were predominantly nonbroadcasting, even though both
subscribers and the general public received the licensee's programming. Id.
34 Id.
274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Id. at 548.
Id. Funtional Music did not involve § 605. The only issue was whether the FCC had
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transmit to the public," because simplex programming was popular with
the free listening audience, and because the station derived substantial
revenues from advertisers desiring to reach that audience.9
After Functional Music, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California held in KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twen-
tieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp."' that multiplex transmissions
were not "broadcasting" under the Act.4 The multiplex system involved
two programs transmitted over two distinct frequencies. 2 The FCC re-
quired a multiplex station to transmit regular FM broadcast signals for
the general public over one frequency. '3 The station then transmitted a
separate program of commercial-free background music over another
frequency that conventional FM radios could not receive." Subscribers
payed a fee for the station to install and maintain special equipment to
erred in ruling that simplexing was not "broadcasting" under the Act, and that FM stations
licensed to broadcast could not offer simplex services. See id.
See text accompanying notes 16 & 18 supra (Act's definitions of broadcasting).
274 F.2d at 548. The Functional Music court examined the early FCC decisions on
the nature of broadcasting, note 26 supra, and stated that these decisions did not form a
basis for holding that simplexing was not broadcasting. Id. The court observed that the con-
tents of the objectionable radio services in the early rulings negated an intent for public
distribution, but that simplexing services were of interest to the general radio audience. Id.
According to the court, the FCC could not bar licensed broadcasting stations from offering
simplex services, because simplexing was a broadcasting service. Id. at 548-59. The Func-
tional Music court stated, however, that its ruling did not preclude the FCC from barring
simplex transmissions on other grounds. I& at 549. Accordingly, the FCC adopted rules pro-
hibiting simplex services on the ground that a broadcasting licensee's contractual relation-
ship with his simplex subscribers could diminish his control over the program selection. FM
Simplex Operations, 2 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1683, 1690-91 (1964); see 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.276(a), (b)
(1964) (FCC regulations prohibiting FM licensees from offering simplex services). The Com-
mission reasoned that a licensee's contractual relationship with simplex subscribers could
prevent him from providing adequate service to his nonsubscription listeners. 2 RAD. REG.
2d (P&F) at 1691.
" 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
1 Id. at 42. The KMLA court considered the status of multiplex systems in order to
answer the question of whether § 605 protected multiplex programming from unauthorized
reception and use. Id at 39-40; see text accompanying notes 14-16 supra (discussing § 605).
KMLA Broadcast Corporation transmitted FM background music to subscribers who paid a
monthly subscription charge. Id at 38. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corporation
purchased Japanese-built multiplex receivers and tuned them to receive KLMA's multiplex
subchannel frequency. Id Twentieth Century installed the receivers, without KMLA's per-
mission, in various commercial establishments which allowed Twentieth Century to place
its vending machines on their premises. Id at 38-39. KMLA sued Twentieth Century under
§ 605 for damages and for an injunction against further distribution of the receivers without
KMLA's consent. Id at 36. KMLA joined as a defendant one of the businesses that received
and used KMLA's programming without permission. I& The court held that § 605 protected
KMLA's transmissions, which were nonbroadcast communications. Id at 42.
42 Id. at 37.
a Id Licensed FM broadcast stations must broadcast to the general public on their
main channel, because the FCC requires licensed stations to serve the public interest. Id
" Id at 37-38.
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receive multiplex transmissions.4 5 The KMLA court characterized
multiplex transmissions as point-to-point communications, and stated
that the nature of FM multiplexing negated any public reception intent.
46
As evidence that the multiplex station did not intend to broadcast its
signals to the general -public, the court noted that the multiplex signals
traveled on a subcarrier frequency,47 and that subscribers needed special
equipment to receive the programming. 8 In addition, the court observed
that the multiplex station geared its program content to subscribers'
needs rather than to the general public's listening taste. 9 The KMLA
court also based its conclusion on the FCC's determination that multi-
plex signals were not "broadcasting" because multiplexers intended
their signals only for subscribers and not for the public generally.,"
Courts addressing the question of whether section 605 protects pay
TV transmissions from unauthorized reception and use have relied on
Functional Music and KMLA as the leading precedents for the statutory
definition of "broadcasting." 51 The earliest pay TV cases involved section
605 claims by Home Box Office, Inc. (HBO).2 HBO transmitted subscrip-
tion programming via an MDS system.55 The MDS system transmitted
the program signal on a microwave frequency from a central transmit-
ting location to specific reception points." HBO affiliates received the
Id at 38.
"Id. at 42. The KMLA court distinguished Functional Music, stating that the simplex
station in Functional Music intended public dissemination of its broadcasts. Id at 40 n.1.
11 264 F. Supp. at 42. The multiplex station in Functional Music transmitted
background music over a subcarrier frequency that was separate from regular FM channels.
I& at 37. Conventional FM radios could not receive the subcarrier frequency. Id at 38.
"Id at 42.
Id; cf. text accompanying notes 35-39 supra (Functional Music decision that simplex-
ing is broadcasting).
10 264 F. Supp. at 41; see 11 RAD. REG. (P&F) 1599 (1955) (FCC opinion that multiplex
signals are not broadcasting). Recently, the FCC changed its opinion that subscription FM
radio services are exclusively point-to-point communications. Report and Order, 61 F.C.C.2d
113, 117-18 (1976). The FCC now recognizes subscription FM radio as a "hybrid" form of
communication, with characteristics of both broadcasting and point-to-point communica-
tions. Id.; text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra (discussing distinction between broad-
casting and point-to-point services). Unlike broadcast communications, however, subscrip-
tion radio transmissions fall under § 605's protection against unauthorized reception and use
of radio transmissions not intended for the public. 264 F. Supp. at 42.
" See, eg., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 681
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on Functional Music); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater
New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on KMLA).
u See Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). Home Box Office's (HBO) programming consisted of motion pictures, sport-
ing events, and other special programs of general public appeal. 474 F. Supp. at 682.
" Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 526
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
" Id. at 526-57.
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signal at these points and converted it into a lower frequency which
regular television sets could receive." The affiliates transmitted the
modulated program signal by cable to subscribers who paid monthly fees
for program service. 6
In two separate actions, HBO sued affiliates under section 605 for
receiving and selling HBO's programming to subscribers without remit-
ting payments to HBO.57 Although the FCC had determined that MDS
transmissions were point-to-point communications subject to section 605
protection,58 two New York federal district courts reached opposite con-
clusions regarding whether MDS services were "broadcasting." 59 In
Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc.,"O the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York applied Functional Music's
reasoning." Observing that HBO programming was of interest to the
general public, the Orth-O-Vision court concluded that HBO transmis-
sions constituted "broadcasting," even though persons could not view
the programs without leasing special equipment.2 Since HBO broadcasts
5 Id
*Id.
11 Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc. 474 F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 527-28 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). In both cases, HBO claimed that its affiliates were pirating its program signals in
violation of § 605. 467 F. Supp. at 528; see 474 F. Supp. at 681; text accompanying notes
14-16 supra (discussing scope of § 605); note 15 supra (basis for private. cause of action under
§ 605).
11 FCC Public Notice No. 11850, Jan. 24, 1979 (FCC determination that MDS transmis-
sions are point-to-point communications).
11 Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(MDS is broadcasting); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp.
525, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (MDS is not broadcasting). The Orth-O-Vision court reasoned that
the FCC determined that MDS services were not broadcasting because of the primary use
of MDS had been to provide commercial subscribers with specialized communications suited
specifically'to their needs. 474 F. Supp. at 682 n.10; see Midwest Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 294, 300
(1975); Midwest Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 897, 899 (1973). Consequently, the court in Orth-O-Vision
stated that the FCC's conclusions did not preclude a finding that MDS services used to pro-
vide television programming of general appeal and marketed to large numbers of the public
constituted "broadcasting." 474 F. Supp. at 682 n.10.
'o 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
61 Id. at 681-82; see text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
12 474 F. Supp. at 681-82. The Orth-O-Vision court distinguished KMLA, stating that
the FM radio station in KMLA intended its background subscription programming for
business establishments only. Id at 682 n.9. Orth-O-Vision held that because KMLA did not
intend its programming to appeal to a mass audience, the multiplex transmissions were not
"broadcasting." Id at 682 & n.9. The court gave weight to the mass appeal of the MDS pro-
gram content in determining that MDS signals were "broadcasting" intended for the
general public. See id
The Orth-O-Vision court also based its decision on the FCC's determination that
subscription television, which differs from MDS, is broadcasting under the Act. Id; see note
2 supra (discussing subscription television technology). The court reasoned that both MDS
and subscription television transmissions require viewers to rent special receiving equip-
ment, and both consist of programming that appeals to mass audience. 474 F. Supp. at 682.
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to the public, the court held that section 605 did not protect HBO trans-
missions. Contrary to the holding in Orth-O-Vision, however, the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York 4 that section 605 did protect
HBO's MDS transmissions. 5 The Pay TV court found KMLA persua-
sive."8 Noting that viewers could not receive MDS transmissions on con-
ventional television sets until special equipment converted the signal,
the court reasoned that HBO intended that only subscribers receive its
signals. 7 Therefore, HBO's transmissions were not "broadcasting" under
the Act."
Disagreement concerning the applicability of section 605 to pay TV
transmissions has not been limited to the HBO/MDS cases. 9 Subsequent
to the HBO cases, two pay TV companies offering STV services brought
section 605 actions in federal court.0 The companies sought injunctive
relief against the manufacture and sale of devices capable of pirating the
companies' program signals.7 ' Two federal courts reached conflicting
conclusions on the issue of whether section 605 protects an STV com-
pany from the unauthorized sale of decoders that enable viewers to en-
joy the company's programming without paying subscription fees.
7
1
Unlike an" MDS system which transmits a signal to specific points where
receiving affiliates modulate the signal for television reception,' the
STV system transmitted a scrambled signal directly to viewers' televi-
sion sets. Conventional sets received the signal, but the resulting image
Therefore, the court concluded that subscription television transmissions are
"broadcasting." Id.
474 F. Supp. at 682.
467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id at 528.
See id. The Pay TV court reasoned that since KMLA applied § 605 to subscription
radio transmissions, the statute also applied to subscription television transmissions. Id-
The Pay TV court's discussion appears gratuitous, however, since the defendant did not
contest the applicability of § 605 to HBO's signals. See id
67 Id.
6Id.
" See text accompanying notes 51-68 supra.
, See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980);
National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
" See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir.
1980); National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 379 (C.D.
Cal. 1980). In National Subscription Television, the plaintiff company sought both injunc-
tive relief and punitive damages. Id at 380.
See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465-66 (6th Cir.
1980) (§ 605 protects STV); National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d
(P&F) 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (§ 605 does not protect STV).
See note 2 supra.
' Chartweli Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1980).
Subscription television programming, like HBO programming, consists of movies, sports
events and other programs of interest to a large audience. Id. at 460; see note 52 supra.
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was unintelligible. 5 Subscribers leased decoding devices from the com-
pany to unscramble the program signal."
In Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook" (Chartwell), the
Sixth Circuit held that section 605 protects STV because STV transmis-
sions are not "broadcasting" within the meaning of section 605.78 The
Chartwell court reasoned that although an STV company broadcasts
programming to the general public, the company intends its programs
for the exclusive use of subscribers. 9 Noting that an STV company
transmits a signal that viewers can receive only through special equip-
ment, the court concluded that STV is not intended for use by the
general public." The Sixth Circuit in Chartwell refused to follow the
FCC's conclusion that STV is "broadcasting."8
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's Chartwell decision, the District
Court for the Central District of California displayed "great deference"
to the FCC's determination that STV is "broadcasting."82 The district
court stated in National Subscription Television v. S&H TV" (NST) that
the crucial factor to consider in determining whether STV is "broadcast-
ing" is that STV programming is of interest to a large segment of the
general public. 4 An STV company intends to broadcast its signal to the
11 Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1980).
76 1d.
77 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
7' Id at 465-66.
11 Id at 465. The Chartwell court stated that availability and use are "separate con-
cepts." Id.
SId. The Chartwell court observed that STV programming had mass appeal and was
available to anyone who wished to pay a subscription fee. Id The court stated that while
these factors favored a finding that STV is "broadcasting" under § 605, the inability of
viewers to enjoy STV transmissions without special equipment negated such a finding. Id
The court cited KMLA as authority for its reasoning. Id.; see text accompanying notes 44-46
supra.
11 637 F.2d at 464-65; see Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of In-
quiry, 3 F.C.C.2d 1, 8-11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Further Notice]. The Chartwell court
stated that the FCC's conclusion that STV is broadcasting was for regulatory purposes on-
ly. 637 F.2d at 464. The FCC determined that STV is broadcasting in response to charges by
major television networks that the FCC lacked the power to authorize and regulate STV.
Id-; Further Notice, supra, at 8-9. The Commission did not decide that STV was broad-
casting within the meaning of § 605, but only that STV fit within the Act's general definition
of broadcasting. 637 F.2d at 464; Further Notice, supra, at 8-10; see 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976).
The FCC concluded that it had authority to regulate STV as a broadcast service. Further
Notice, supra, at 8-10. The Chartwell court found, however, that the FCC's ruling that STV
is broadcasting for regulatory purposes is not binding authority for courts addressing the
issues of whether STV is "broadcasting" in the context of § 605 and whether § 605 protects
STV transmissions from unauthorized reception and use. 637 F.2d at 464-65.
82 National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381 (C.D.
Cal. 1980).
83 Id.
11 M; see Further Notice, supra note 81, at 9 (FCC opinion that touchstone of broad-
casting is intent of broadcaster to provide television service to as many members of public
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public,85 even- though viewers need special equipment to decode the
signal." Accordingly, the NST court ruled that an STV company could
not state a claim under section 605 for protection from distribution of
devices capable of decoding the company's signal.
1
7
The sharp disagreement among courts and the FCC over whether
pay TV services constitute "broadcasting" exempt from section 605 pro-
tection suggests that radio communications technology has burgeoned
beyond the scope of the Communications Act.88 Pay TV technologies do
not fit well into either of the two general classifications of radio com-
munications existing when Congress enacted section 605.89 MDS and
STV services have characteristics of both point-to-point communications,
which section 605 protects,0 and broadcast communications, which sec-
tion 605 excludes from its protective scope.9 Consequently, courts apply-
ing section 605 to protect pay TV companies from signal pirates have
emphasized that pay TV, like other point-to-point services, transmits a
signal to specific persons.2 Courts wishing to exclude pay TV from sec-
as are interested); Fourth Report and Order on Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C. 2d 465,
472 (1968) (approving decision in Further Notice), affd, National Ass'n of Theater Owners v.
F.C.C., 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
,5 The court in National Subscription Television (NST) found no distinction between
the words "general public" in § 605 and "public" in § 153(o) of the Act. 48 RAD. REG. 2d at
380; see text accompanying notes 16 & 18 supra.
m 48 RAD. REG. 2d at 381. The NST court cited Functional Music as controlling
authority on the question of whether STV programming is broadcasting under the Act. Id.;
see text accompanying note 37 supra.
17 48 RAD. REG. 2d at 381.
I See National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. F.C.C., 420 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(responding to argument that FCC exceeded authority under Communications Act in
authorizing STV because Act did not contemplate STV); Note, Subscription Television, The
FCC, And The Courts, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 283, 288 (1970) (noting technological revolu-
tion in communications and suggesting that Act did not contemplate television).
" See STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 123-27 (suggesting that FCC should classify STV
as hybrid technology with characteristics of both point-to-point and broadcasting services);
First Report on Subscription Television Service, 23 F.C.C. 532, 541 (1957) (FCC proposal to
classify STV as neither broadcasting nor point-to-point service for regulatory purposes);
text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra (discussing broadcasting and point-to-point com-
munications). The FCC ultimately decided to classify STV as broadcasting for regulatory
purposes. Further Notice, supra note 81, at 9; Fourth Report and Order on Subscription
Television, 15 F.C.C. 2d 465, 472 (1968). The Sixth Circuit has decided, however, that STV
has sufficient nonbroadcasting characteristics to merit § 605 protection. Chartwell Com-
munications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465-66 (6th Cir. 1980); see text accompany-
ing notes 77-81 supra (discussing Chartwell).
0 Pay TV resembles point-to-point communication in that companies transmit program
signals to a particular class of listeners. See text accompanying notes 53-56, 73-76 supra.
91 Pay TV resembles broadcasting in that the program content has mass appeal and
companies offer their service to all persons who wish to subscribe to it. See text accompany-
ing notes 62, 63, 84 & 85 supra.
" Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, 467 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); text accompanying notes 64-68, 77-80 supra.
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tion 605 protection have emphasized that pay TV companies, like other
broadcasters, transmit programming of mass appeal for as many
members of the public as wish to view the service. 3
The hybrid nature of pay TV technologies raises a serious question
of whether MDS and STV fall within the coverage of section 605.1' The
legislative history of section 605 does not elucidate the statute's pur-
pose. 5 Courts have attributed various purposes to the provision. The
purposes attributed to section 605 include protecting defendants from
the admission at trial of evidence obtained through wiretapping,98 pro-
tecting short-wave radio transmissions from unauthorized interception
and divulgence, 97 and protecting telephone and telegram communications
from divulgence by operators. 8 The suggested purposes of section 605
imply a general congressional intent that the statute should protect
private messages transmitted via radio and wire between two persons
or among a group of persons. 9 Typically, courts and the FCC have labeled
such private messages as point-to-point communications. 110 Thus, a
strong argument exists for the proposition that Congress' sole purpose
in enacting section 605 was to protect the integrity of the nation's point-
to-point communications system, including telephone, telegraph, and
private radio transmissions. 10 By applying section 605 to pay TV, courts
stretch the statute beyond its proper scope, since pay TV services are
not strictly point-to-point communications. 2
,1 National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAI. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 681-82 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); text accompanying notes 60-63, 83-87 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
95 E.g., National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381
(C.D. Cal. 1980); United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55, 58 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United
States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see note 14 supra (sug-
gesting wiretap protection of § 605 no longer needed).
', United States v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356, 358 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
, United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v.
Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480, 481 (D.D.C. 1953).
" See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356, 358 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (Congress in-
tended § 605 to protect all private radio communications); United States v. Sullivan, 116 F.
Supp. 480, 481 (D.D.C. 1953) (Congress intended § 605 to protect wire communications such
as telephone and telegraph).
10 E.g., Functional Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1959); National
Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1980);
Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (§ 605 intended to
protect privacy of telephone communications); United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480,
481 (D.D.C. 1953) (§ 605 intended to protect private message via telephone, telegraph, and
private radio); text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
'" See notes 90 & 91 supra. Pay TV not only fails to come within § 605's coverage of
point-to-point communications but also fails to come within § 605's exclusionary clause, since
pay TV companies do not intend their signals for the use of the general public. See ki; text
accompanying note 16 supra.
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Courts invoking section 605 to protect pay TV companies from signal
pirates regulate the pay TV market by discouraging competition that is
harmful to the pay TV companies.103 Nothing in the statute's legislative
or judicial history suggests, however, that Congress intended courts to
use section 605 to set market policy. 14 Congress alone has the authority
to establish economic policy in the communications industry."5 Accord-
ingly, courts should not invoke section 605 to prohibit signal piracy."6
Without protection under section 605, however, pay TV companies
have little defense against signal pirates. Companies that transmit pro-
gramming to subscribers via MDS systems1 0 7 can claim federal copyright
protection from unauthorized retransmissions of their programming by
affiliates."8 Under the Copyright Act of 1976,19 a pay TV company own-
ing copyrighted program material1 0 has the exclusive right to "perform"
1' National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381 (C.D.
Cal. 1980).
104 See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.
103 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d
(P&F) 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants
Congress the power to regulate the communications industry. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650, 655 (1936); see Olson & Obserstein, Aspects of-Pay Televi-
sion: Regulation, Constitutional Law, Antitrust, 53 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Oison & Oberstein]. Radio and television transmissions fall within Con-
gress' power over interstate commerce. See 297 U.S. at 655 (Congress can regulate broad-
casting under commerce clause, since broadcasting transcends state lines and is national in
scope). Thus Congress has authority to regulate STV transmissions which travel freely
through the airways and can easily cross state borders. See id.; note 2 supra (discussing
STV technology). Even MDS transmissions which reach subscribers by cable and remain
within state borders "affect" interstate commerce and thus come within the commerce
clause, because much of the programming, such as sports events and movies, originated in
other states. Olson & Oberstein, supra, at 1385; see note 2 supra (discussing MDS
technology). In addition, local STV or MDS transmissions compete with other television pro-
gramming and thus have a substantial economic impact on the television industry. Olson &
Oberstein, supra, at 1385. This economic effect brings local pay TV transmissions within
Congress' commerce power. Id.; see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (Congress
can regulate local activity that has substantial economic effect on interstate commerce).
"0 National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); cf. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1964) (suggesting
in dictum that public policy alone not justification for granting cable television company
judicial relief from unauthorized use of programming).
' See note 2 supra (discussing MDS systems).
'O Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 675,684-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see text accompanying note 57 supra (discussing unauthorized retransmission of pay TV
programming).
II 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. 1 1978).
I Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. H 1978), copyright pro-
tection extends to motion pictures and other audiovisual works. Id § 102(6). The Copyright
Act broadly defines audiovisual works as works that consist of related images and which
one can show by the use of projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment. Id § 101. Thus, pay
TV programming consisting of motion pictures and recorded sporting events is
copyrightable material. 474 F. Supp. at 684.
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the material publicly."' Thus, any unauthorized public performance of the
company's copyrighted material infringes the company's exclusive
right.1 12 An affiliate's retransmission of a pay TV company's MDS signal
is a public "performance" of the company's material.113 Therefore, such a
secondary transmission," if unauthorized, violates the company's
copyright in its material.115
..t 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (Supp. II 1978). Under the Copyright Act, exhibition of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work constitutes a "performance" of the work. I& § 101.
Transmitting a performance of a work to the public by means of any device is a "public per-
formance" under the Act. Id.
I" Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 17
U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. 11 1978). Unauthorized use of copyrighted material constitutes in-
fringement only if the use violates an exclusive right of the copyright owner under the
Copyright Act. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1975); 474 F.
Supp. at 685; see 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. II 1978). A copyright owner who has registered
his copyright in the Copyright Office has standing to sue for infringement. 474 F. Supp. at
685; 17 U.S.C. §§ 410(a), 411(a), 501(b) (Supp. II 1978). Remedies for infringement include
temporary and final injunctions against further infringing activity, and damages. Id- §§ 502,
504.
"1 Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 17
U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. II 1978); 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18[B] (1980) [herein-
after cited as NIMMER]; see note 111 supra. A pay TV company's MDS transmission to an
affiliate is a "primary transmission" under the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)
(Supp. II 1978). The affiliate's retransmission of the MDS signal to viewers is a "secondary
transmission." Id. Although the Copyright Act's definition of "performance," id. § 101, see
note 111 supra, does not expressly include secondary transmissions, authorities agree that
the Act's structure and legislative history indicate that Congress intended secondary
transmissions of copyrighted works, including pay TV programming, to constitute "per-
formances" of the works. 474 F. Supp. at 685; 2 NIMMER, supra, § 8.18[B] at 8-197, § 8.18[D] at
8-206; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5707.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, which preceded the 1976 Act, the retransmission of
copyrighted material did not constitute a "performance" of the material. Teleprompter
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); 474 F. Supp. at 685. Fortnightly and
Teleprompter held that cable television companies did not "perform" copyrighted works
when the companies retransmitted broadcast signals from television stations to viewers.
415 U.S. at 408-09; 392 U.S. at 399-401; see note 2 supra (discussing cable television). Since
retransmissions of copyrighted material did not constitute "performances" of the material,
the retransmissions did not infringe the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform his
works. 415 U.S. at 412-15; 392 U.S. at 402; see text accompanying note 111 supra. While the
Copyright Act of 1976 makes retransmissions of copyrighted material "performances," the
Act provides that retransmissions by cable companies with FCC licenses do not infringe
copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(c), (d) (Supp. II 1978); 2 NIMMER, supra, § 8.18[d] at 8-206 at 8-207.
.t. See note 113 supra.
" Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.18[B] at 8-195 to 8-198 (unauthorized secondary transmis-
sions of copyrighted works constitute "performances" and infringe copyrights). While the
Copyright Act of 1976 exempts some secondary transmissions from infringement status, a
secondary transmission of copyrighted material constitutes infringement if the primary
transmission is limited to reception by particular members of the public. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
111(b) (Supp. II 1978). Pay TV transmissions to receiving affiliates are primary transmis-
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Although the Copyright Act protects a pay TV company offering
MDS services, the Act-apparently does not protect a company that
transmits STV programming against unauthorized reception of its sig-
nal."1 6 An STV company transmits its scrambled signal into the airways
for subscribers to receive and unscramble with equipment rented from
the company." 7 Unauthorized persons who use pirate devices to receive
a company's transmissions intercept the signal and unscramble it.118 STV
pirates do not retransmit a company's programming, and thus do not
"perform" a company's copyrighted works."' Therefore, STV pirates do
not infringe a company's exclusive right to perform its copyrighted
material.
1 20
Before the Copyright Act of 1976, pay TV companies could have
claimed protection from unauthorized reception and use of their trans-
missions under state common law of unfair competition."' The doctrine
of unfair competition rests on the theory that one party should not reap
the benefits of another party's expenditures of labor, skill and money.'
2
A pay TV company that labors to compile and transmit its programming
expects to realize profits from subscription and equipment rental fees.
1"
sions within the meaning of § 111(b) of the Copyright Act. 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, §
8.18[D] at 8-206 to 8-207; see 474 F. Supp. at 685. Therefore, an unauthorized secondary
transmission of copyrighted pay TV programming constitutes infringement. 474 F. Supp. at
685; 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.18[D] at 8-206.
11I See note 2 supra (discussing STV). No court opinions have addressed the issue of
whether STV companies can claim copyright protection from signal pirates.
"7 I&
118 See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir.
1980) (suit by STV company against signal pirates).
1 See text accompanying note 113 supra.
See text accompanying notes 113 & 114 supra. Even if a court would consider the
reception of STV transmissions by unauthorized persons as a "performance" under the
Copyright Act, such reception by individuals or groups of viewers does not constitute a
"public performance" of copyrighted works. See 2 NImMER, supra note 113, § 8.18[C], at
8-200 to 8-201 (reception of television or radio signals in private homes, hotels or motels not
"public performance" of transmitted material); text accompanying note 111 supra. Only
unauthorized public performances of copyrighted works infringe the exclusive right of the
owner of copyrighted audiovisual works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 501(a) (Supp. 1 1978); see text
accompanying notes 111 & 112 supra.
See KLMA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264
F. Supp. 35, 44 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (subscription radio company granted unfair competition
relief from unauthorized use of programming).
11 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918). Interna-
tional News Service (INS) pirated news that Associated Press (AP) had compiled through
its own effort and expense. Id at 231. INS sold the news to competitors of AP. Id. The
United States Supreme Court stated that INS had appropriated the fruits of AP's labors.
Id. at 239-40. The Court held that INS had competed unfairly by diverting AP's profits. Id
at 240. The policy underlying unfair competition theory is that every competitor in the
market should exercise his own skill and resources, and not appropriate the product of
another person's efforts. 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS
876 (2d ed. 1950). See generally 9 ARiz. L. REV. 315 (1967).
113 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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Persons who sell devices capable of receiving the company's signals to
nonsubscribers, or who transmit the company's programming to nonsub-
scribers without remitting revenues to the company, benefit from the
company's expenditures of labor, skill, and money.124 Such interference
with a business at the point where a company expects to realize its pro-
fits constitutes unfair competition."
The Copyright Act, however, preempts state unfair competition
claims by pay TV companies.28 The Act expressly abolishes all state law
rights in copyrightable material that are "equivalent" to any of the ex-
clusive rights of copyright owners under the Act."7 The exclusive rights
of copyright owners include the rights to reproduce, perform, distribute,
or display their works."28 The right that a pay TV company seeks to pro-
tect through a state unfair competition claim is the right to transmit its
programming for a profit." The right of a pay TV company to transmit
its programming for a profit is "equivalent" to a company's exclusive
right under the Copyright Act to exhibit its copyrighted material."0 Con-
sequently, the Copyright Act preempts state unfair competition claims
by pay TV companies against signal pirates, even though STV com-
11 See KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264
F. Supp. 35, 44 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (unauthorized persons who received and marketed plaintiff
subscription radio station's transmissions intended for subscribers appropriated fruits of
plaintiffs labor and expense).
11 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918); KMLA
Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 44 (C.D.
Cal. 1967). Two Supreme Court cases subsequent to International News Service have
restricted state unfair competition theory. Unfair Competition, supra note 6, at 534; see
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964). The companion cases of Sears and Compco held
that when an article is unprotected under federal patent or copyright laws, state unfair
competition law may not prevent persons from copying the article. 376 U.S. at 238-39; 376
U.S. at 231-32. Since pay TV program material is subject to copyright, Sears and Compco
would not bar companies from asserting unfair competition claims against pirates. See note
110 supra.
1" Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. II 1978). The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, invalidates state law that is contrary to or addressed by federal
legislation. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
127 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. II 1978); see Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474
F. Supp. 672, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 1978).
" Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see text accompanying note 123 supra (generally describing operation of pay TV company).
I Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc. 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see 1 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 1.01[B][1] at 1-9 to 1-11 (citing Orth-O-Vision). Even though a
right that state law protects is not identical to an exclusive right under the Copyright Act,
the state law is preempted if the right it protects "comes within the general scope of
copyright." 474 F. Supp. at 684; see 1 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 1.01[BI[] at 1-9 to 1-11.
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panies cannot gain copyright protection against pirates."'
Pay TV companies have few legal remedies for signal piracy."2 Thus
Congress should act to ensure the continued success of pay TV, either by
amending section 605 or by enacting legislation specifically prohibiting
piracy of pay TV programming.'33 Congressional response to the need for
pay TV protection could have great impact on the development of a
future television service, direct broadcast satellites (DBS)."' A DBS
system involves the transmission of television signals to a satellite
which transmits the signals to receivers installed at individual
subscribers' homes."5 The receiver consists of a parabolic dish antenna
and equipment to convert the signals to a lower frequency for conven-
tional television reception.'38
Because of the enormous costs of introducing DBS to the communica-
tions market, the success of the satellite industry will depend upon its
ability to attract large numbers of subscribers willing to purchase
receivers."" DBS will experience intense competition from existing
forms of pay TV and can ill afford additional competition from makers of
pirate satellite receivers."' DBS, like pay TV, is a hybrid communica-
tions service which will not fit within the protective scope of section
605."'3 In addition, the FCC has announced an intention to pursue a
hands-off policy in regulating DBS.'" Therefore, if DBS is to become a
viable entertainment option for the American television audience, Con-
"' Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
see 1 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 1.01[B][1] at 1-17 (Copyright Act preempts state unfair com-
petition doctrine of misappropriation); text accompanying notes 116-20 supra (reason STV
companies cannot claim copyright protection). Although the behavior that a pay TV com-
pany seeks to enjoin under state law does not violate the Copyright Act, the Act preempts
the state law if the state law protects a right "equivalent" to a right protected under the
Act. 1 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 1011B][1] at 1-11.
" See text accompanying notes 107-31 supra.
' See National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 48 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 379, 381
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (dictum) (unless Congress amends § 605, courts should not grant relief under
§ 605 against signal piracy).
' See Henry, supra note 7, at 576-77 (discussing international use of direct boradcast
satellites (DBS) and stating that DBS survival will require international legal protection
against piracy).
"' STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. A direct broadcast satellite would orbit the earth
22,300 miles above the equator. Id. The satellite could transmit signals covering entire time
zones, or could transmit spot beams covering smaller areas. Id at 9. With numerous
satellites in orbit, subscribers could enjoy many channels of DBS programming. Id
"4Id. at 7-8.
" Id. at 9. If produced in high volume, DBS receiving equipment would cost
subscribers between $200 and $500. Id. at 8. The financial success of DBS will require that
several million households purchase or rent receiving equipment. Id.
"4See STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
133 See id at 129; text accompanying notes 89-102 supra.
' BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1980, at 24. The FCC has stated that the highly competitive
nature of the communications market precludes the need for heavy regulation of DBS. Id
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141 See note 134 supra.
